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INTRODUCTION
On the morning of December 6, 1987, 250,000 people swarmed the U.S. National Mall.1 Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev was 
to arrive the following day to meet with President 
Ronald Reagan for a new set of talks that marked a 
warming in the seemingly interminable Cold War. A 
future recipient of the Nobel Prize and Time’s person 
of the decade, Gorbachev had entranced the Western 
world as a great compromiser who had brought 
communism with a human face to the Eastern Bloc 
and the potential of world peace in the face of nuclear 
apocalypse.2 However, the quarter-million people 
on the frozen National Mall did not care about 
Gorbachev’s public image. They wanted him to make 
a commitment that the millions of Jewish people 
who had suffered decades of state-sponsored anti-
Semitism in the U.S.S.R. would be granted increased 
religious freedom and the right to emigrate. Chants 
of “Let my people go!” echoed throughout the 
National Mall over the course of the day, a phrase 
that had been the clarion call for many of these 
people for almost thirty years. 3 
 This event, called Freedom Sunday, had 
substantial representation from many of the larger 
American Jewish organizations, whose leaders 
spoke alongside Soviet Jewish dissidents known as 
refuseniks.4 The protestors were accompanied by 
government support. Vice President George H.W. 
Bush spoke, as did U.S. Senator Bob Dole (R-KS), 
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Jim 
Wright (D-TX), New York City Mayor Ed Koch, 
former Secretary of State Al Haig, Governor Thomas 
Kean of New Jersey, and Civil Rights hero, U.S. 
Representative John Lewis (D-GA).5  These people 
of divergent backgrounds gathered to stand for the 
rights of an ethnic group in a land thousands of 
miles away. They spoke of the suffering that Jews had 
endured there, their inability to leave, and the abuses 
inflicted upon them by security forces including the 
KGB for the expression of their religious and cultural 
identity. As a result, Gorbachev created reforms, 
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which enabled millions of Soviet Jews to leave the 
country.
These reforms, however, were a long time in 
the making. Between the early 1960s and 1989, the 
Soviet Jewry movement transformed from a small 
student group in New York City to a major feature of 
the American Jewish community.i  Its support base 
grew across the country, in the U.S. Congress, and 
eventually in the White House under the Reagan 
Administration.6,ii How did this happen? A common 
assumption would attribute success to the efforts of 
the nation’s large Jewish organizations, which often 
seemed to be the base of the money and power 
needed to execute campaigns such as Freedom 
Sunday, or the large marches down Fifth Avenue in 
New York City held in the name of Soviet Jewry over 
the prior two decades. But Freedom Sunday was 
not necessarily the brainchild of solely the Jewish 
establishment. A large number of grassroots Jewish 
activists, predominantly represented by the Student 
Struggle for Soviet Jewry (SSSJ), was just as involved 
in organizing this event and other campaigns for 
Soviet Jewry. Glenn Richter, a co-founder of the 
SSSJ, claimed it was ultimately his cohorts that 
organized this particular demonstration, while the 
establishment footed the bill and got the credit.7 To 
the public, the movement appeared to be a seamless 
alliance of mainstream and grassroots forces working 
to achieve a similar goal; however, the relationship 
between the mainstream Jewish organizations and 
the smaller, more grassroots organizers of the Soviet 
Jewry movement was closer to a rivalry. Beneath the 
veneer of perfect unity presented at Freedom Sunday 
lay decades-old tensions between two factions that 
stemmed from differences in their respective tactics 
and philosophies.
I intend to show that the Soviet Jewry 
movement in the United States was characterized 
by a division between grassroots organizers and 
Jewish establishment organizations. The former 
were innovators in the early stages of the movement 
i There is no official start date for the Soviet Jewry movement in America, as 
there arguably was for something like the American Gay Rights movement 
with the 1969 Stonewall Riots. Moshe Decter’s 1961 article in Foreign Affairs 
entitled “The Status on Jews in the U.S.S.R.” brought the plight of Soviet 
Jews to the attention of many Americans for the first time. Similarly, the 
founding of the Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry (SSSJ) in 1964 and its first 
demonstration on May 1, 1964 may be seen as the movement’s first public 
protest. For these reasons, I want to suggest that the movement began in an 
ambiguous period between 1961 and 1964. I would consider its end date to be 
1989, when Gorbachev eliminated emigration quotas.
ii  As the thesis will show, Reagan became a strong ally of the Soviet Jewry 
movement after its goals were seriously opposed by previous Administrations.
and preferred nonviolent demonstrations, civil 
disobedience, and governmental pressure towards 
the U.S.S.R. as a means of achieving their goal. The 
latter had both the money and the government 
connections to make a difference, but were nervous 
that the activities of the grassroots organizers 
would lead to negative repercussions from the 
Soviet government in the form of punishment of 
the U.S.S.R’s Jewish population. The establishment 
instead preferred negotiations to enable the release of 
Soviet Jews, something that was greatly threatened by 
the grassroots activists’ pressure. 
I have arrived at this view after carefully 
examining a series of primary and secondary sources. 
Through my research in the SSSJ Archives at Yeshiva 
University and the Council on Soviet Jewry (CSJ) 
Archives at the Center for Jewish History, I came to 
understand the internal life of each faction and how 
it individually contributed to the schism between the 
factions. The SSSJ Archives contain documents that 
articulate the SSSJ’s plans for demonstrations in the 
late 1960s and its negative opinions on establishment 
organizations. Additionally, the collection features 
a series of bulletins and letters between the SSSJ 
and larger organizations from the period 1966 to 
1971 that highlight the tensions between the groups. 
The documents, especially the internal memoranda 
among establishment groups, depict a palpable fear 
of upsetting the Soviets through excessive aggressive 
activism. At the same time, letters and private notes 
from the grassroots organizations reveal frustration 
with the slow pace of the Jewish establishment’s 
push for emigration rights and a breakdown of 
communication between the factions. The Center for 
Jewish History provide letters from the leaders of the 
American Jewish Committee (AJC) in the late 1970s. 
The letters, bulletins, and private writings of each 
group’s members reflect a respective skepticism of 
grassroots initiatives and a desire to negotiate directly 
with the Soviet authorities to increase the quotas 
of Jews allowed to leave the U.S.S.R.  These letters 
speak to plans to meet with Soviet officials in private 
to negotiate increased quotas and show a growing 
willingness to steer the movement into a quieter 
direction.
I conducted an interview with SSSJ leader 
Glenn Richter and studied the diary of President 
Ronald Reagan and the memoir of his second 
Secretary of State George P. Shultz. These 
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perspectives were necessary to understand how 
the Reagan Administration changed the executive 
branch’s response to the Soviet Jewry movement and 
how the administration ultimately connected and 
corresponded its ideals. It also highlighted the variety 
of tactics the administration used to achieve these 
ends.
In addition to this primary source research, I 
studied secondary source materials that shed more 
light on the structural differences between the two 
factions. The secondary sources I used to study 
the Soviet Jewry movement from the 1960s to the 
1980s included Peter Golden’s O Powerful, Western 
Star, Frederick Lazin’s The Struggle for Soviet Jewry 
in American Politics, and Gal Beckerman’s When 
They Come for Us, We’ll be Gone. Beckerman’s book 
is probably the most famous piece on this subject, 
although it is imperfect due to its consideration 
of the Soviet Jewry Movement as a mostly unified 
group with little internal division. While I accept 
much of his information, his perception of relative 
unanimity is one I try to show as too simplistic. I 
also used Jussi M. Hanhimaki’s The Rise and Fall 
of Détente, Walter Isaacson’s Kissinger, and Robert 
G. Kaufman’s biography of U.S. Senator Henry M. 
“Scoop” Jackson (D-WA) to better understand the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Federal Trade Act, 
a 1974 amendment that served as a strong point of 
contention for the two factions in the Soviet Jewry 
movement, crystalizing the schism between the two 
groups.
One interesting trend I found in the 
historiography was the phenomenon of political 
action driven by ideology endemic to the grassroots 
activists and a number of other causes in post-war 
America. A number of books, including Cheryl 
Lynn Greenberg’s Troubling the Waters and Michael 
E. Staub’s Torn at the Roots, show that many alumni 
of the civil rights movement were present in the 
SSSJ and that their demonstrations had similar 
tactics. The Jewish establishment, which avoided 
demonstrations, did not share these similarities, and 
the historiography suggests a longstanding reluctance 
to radical activism that may have inspired such 
sentiments. In addition to the civil rights movement, 
this unique trend of ideology-driven politics also 
seemed to include U.S. Senator Henry M. “Scoop” 
Jackson (D-WA) and President Reagan, both strong 
allies of the grassroots activists. Each of them had 
a certain kind of telos that they wanted to achieve 
by any means necessary, and each used the cause of 
Soviet Jews as a means of achieving those ends. Given 
the common strand of thought, this phenomenon 
can be seen as a connection between the humble 
origins of the movement overall and its final place as 
a central tenet of American foreign policy at the end 
of the Cold War.
The first section of the thesis will outline 
the birth of the Soviet Jewry movement and will 
introduce the players within each faction, as well 
as their driving ideologies. The second section 
will discuss the different factions’ reactions to the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment, showing how the 
natural rift between the two factions’ strategy grew 
wider. The third section will deal with the Reagan 
Administration’s change of policy towards the 
U.S.S.R. It will discuss how this change, as well as 
President Reagan’s respective support from both 
factions, stirred by his own political ideology, 
eventually blurred the divisions between the two 
factions in the final, most fruitful years of the 
movement. 
The major players of this period are 
numerous, and are sometimes better represented as 
organizations rather than as individuals. The first of 
the two factions, the grassroots activists, consisted 
primarily of the Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry 
(SSSJ) founded in 1964 by Jacob Birnbaum and co-
lead by Glenn Richter. Its allies included Holocaust 
survivor and activist Elie Wiesel, Rabbi Avraham 
“Avi” Weiss of Riverdale, New York, and a host of 
other rabbis, student-activists, and advocates. In 
a distinct category but tied more to the grassroots 
movement than to the establishment were the 
refuseniks, a group of Soviet Jewish activists who were 
penalized by the Soviet authorities for attempting 
to emigrate. They included Natan (born Anatoly) 
Sharansky, his wife, Avital Sharansky, Ida Nudel, and 
many other allied individuals.iii 
The second faction, the establishment, was 
slightly more amorphous. It included most of the 
major Jewish organizations in the United States at 
the time, though I will mainly focus on the American 
Jewish Committee (AJC) and, to a lesser extent, 
the Council of Presidents. Another more distinct 
iii Natan Sharansky was born Anatoly Sharansky in 1948 in the Ukrainian 
Soviet Socialist Republic. He was known as such until his release from the 
gulag in 1986 and subsequent emigration to Israel, where he changed his first 
name. To avoid any confusion, I have decided to refer to him by his current 
appellation for all periods of time.
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group within this faction was the Council on Soviet 
Jewry (CSJ), who went by a variety of similar names 
throughout the movement’s history. This group 
served as the coordinating arm of the establishment 
that had the most contact with grassroots organizers 
but operated under the demands of parent 
organizations. Since the leadership roles tended to 
change frequently among these groups, it is difficult 
to designate individual figures as major figures, yet 
certain individuals such as Richard Maas of the AJC, 
Morris Abram, and Albert Chernin of the CSJ and 
philanthropists Max Fisher and Jacob Stein were 
important actors.
Also important to observe are government 
officials who reacted to the movement. There were 
politicians such as U.S. Senator Henry M. “Scoop” 
Jackson (D-WA) who supported pressuring the 
U.S.S.R. to ensure emigration rights for its Jewish 
citizens and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, 
whose policy of détente was threatened by the Soviet 
Jewry movement and Senator Jackson’s legislation. 
Later players included President Reagan and 
Secretary of State George P. Shultz, who were part 
of an administration that was much more active 
than others in helping Soviet Jews. They pressured 
the U.S.S.R. to allow for greater emigration rights, 
as well as the emancipation of the refuseniks and 
consequently developed positive relations with both 
factions of the Soviet Jewry movement. 
What becomes clear throughout this essay is 
that, while these differences may have divided the 
movement, they made it more effective in certain 
ways. Both factions had distinct responsibilities 
and capabilities in their goal of achieving basic 
emigration rights for Soviet Jews. Therefore, while 
it may seem that the two factions were working 
against each other, it was not the adoption of a 
common strategy, but rather, the multiplicity of 
strategies that they were able to employ as a whole, 
which enabled their ultimate success in achieving 
this crucial goal for Soviet Jews. Their success was 
the product of a multi-faceted dynamism of both 
strategies engaging different aspects of Soviet and 
American policymaking. While the grassroots 
activists stimulated the American government 
to take aggressive action against the Soviets, the 
establishment tried to initiate diplomatic negotiations 
with the Soviets to ensure the Jews’ right to emigrate. 
SECTION I: BEGINNINGS
The divergence of strategies between the 
grassroots activists, and the establishment was 
evident at the beginning of the Soviet Jewry 
movement. Although Jews in the U.S.S.R. had been 
limited in their religious rights and prohibited from 
emigrating since the premiership of Joseph Stalin, 
the efforts in Jewish community in the United States 
to support those emigration rights did not truly 
start until the 1960s. The movement’s grassroots 
activists were the first people to campaign in the 
United States on behalf of Soviet Jewry. They 
had a very different set of tactics than the more 
powerful Jewish organizations that would later 
play a large administrative role in advocacy for the 
Soviet Jewry. Despite the factions’ similar goals, the 
aforementioned differences were deeply rooted and 
prevalent in the early days of the movement. This is 
seen in each faction’s preferred methods of action 
and respective relationships with earlier campaigns 
for the betterment of African Americans. While 
the mainstream organizations kept their black 
counterparts at arm’s length, the progenitors of the 
grassroots activists were more tightly knit. This is 
shown in the historiography that links the grassroots 
activists and the civil rights movement, as well as 
in the primary source documents that highlight 
infighting between the factions.
The first leaders of the grassroots faction were 
student protesters from New York City in the early 
1960s. The largest and most important group was 
the Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry (SSSJ), whose 
original support base came from young students 
from various New York universities and Orthodox 
day schools, such as Ramaz, Yeshiva of Flatbush, and 
Manhattan Talmudic Academy. Jacob Birnbaum, a 
German-born scholar who had moved to London 
as a boy to escape Nazi tyranny, founded the SSSJ in 
1964. Birnbaum worked to help Jews in the diaspora, 
including Holocaust survivors and those behind the 
Iron Curtain.8 He came to New York in the early 
1960s where he continued his social work in the 
Jewish community. Upon reading a groundbreaking 
1961 article by Moshe Decter in Foreign Affairs that 
highlighted the prohibitions against Jewish religious 
expression and practice as well as the use of the 
Yiddish language by Russian Jews, Birnbaum decided 
to make the alleviation of their plight his mission in 
life and therefore founded the SSSJ.9 
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 The first meeting of the SSSJ convened 
at Columbia University on April 27, 1964, after 
Birnbaum posted flyers at “Yeshiva, City University, 
Columbia, the Jewish Theological Seminary and 
New York University.”10 In the pamphlet, he called 
for “a grassroots movement—spearheaded by the 
student youth…a well-planned campaign to include 
some very active measures…which will be a force 
to be reckoned with.”11 Birnbaum’s choice of words 
evidences the urgency and dynamism that he 
demanded from the youth of the city. Being forceful 
in demanding religious and emigration rights for 
Soviet Jews would be a key characteristic of the 
grassroots faction of the movement.
Within a short period of time, Birnbaum 
quickly rallied supporters for his cause. No more 
than four days after the first meeting, he was able 
to convene 1,000 people in front of the U.S.S.R. 
Mission to the United Nations, marching in rows 
of two and holding placards that read “I am My 
Brother’s Keeper” and “Let Them Pray.”12 A focus 
on morality and determination was already present 
in this auspicious beginning, as made evident by 
these placards. “I am My Brother’s Keeper” is a 
reference to the story of Cain and Abel, suggesting 
that American Jews had a responsibility to look out 
for their brethren in the U.S.S.R. ”Let Them Pray” is 
a reference to the prohibitions against religious life 
in the U.S.S.R., including those against the teaching 
of Hebrew and the maintenance of Jewish schools. 
The placard underscores the movement’s fight for 
religious freedom. The significant media attention 
that this march at the United Nations brought was 
an auspicious beginning for the movement, which 
would be made evident in a wide array of political 
action, including two “Exodus” marches in 1965 
in Washington, D.C., and 1969 in New York, each 
enlisting over 10,000 activists.13 
As previously noted, the civil rights movement 
of the 1950s and 1960s heavily influenced the 
SSSJ. There are superficial connections to the 
demonstrations for desegregation, including the 
single-file marching in the first SSSJ meeting and the 
use of “I am My Brother’s Keeper,” a phrase that white 
Americans used to support African Americans in the 
civil rights movement. In his book Silent No More, 
Henry L. Feingold presents evidence that strengthens 
this connection to the civil rights movement, noting 
that the tactics that the SSSJ employed included 
“sit-ins and lie-ins, chaining oneself to fences at 
the Soviet Mission…and dozens of specialized 
techniques to win public attention,” which were all 
methods of protest previously adopted by the civil 
rights movement.14
There were also many veterans of the civil rights 
movement in the SSSJ, including those who were 
involved in more radical factions like the Student 
Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). In 
his book O Powerful Western Star!, Peter Golden 
expounds on this connection by examining the 
career of SSSJ leader Glenn Richter. He discusses 
how Richter volunteered “in the New York Office of 
SNCC” and attempted to join the Freedom Riders, 
a 1964 voting rights movement in the southern 
United States whose repression by southern whites 
would claim the life of his Queens College classmate, 
Andrew Goodman.15 The skills that Richter gained 
from working with SNCC enabled him to be effective 
in planning rallies. This efficacy is best demonstrated 
by a pamphlet from the SSSJ Archives for a successful 
Hanukkah march in Greenwich Village. Richter 
meticulously planned the march, which attracted 
3,000 people. He directed the students where to 
march, how to avoid arrest, and reminded them 
to “use [their] intelligence.”16 In addition, there 
were a number of solidarity protests on the same 
day across the country, run by a bevy of student 
organizations that Richter and other SSSJ leaders 
helped to coordinate. The fact that mere students 
were in control of these large outpourings of people 
suggests strong coordination with little help from 
outside organizations, similar to the way in which 
SNCC and other civil rights factions operated in their 
campaigns. 
Another tactic that bears major similarities to 
the civil rights movement was the shaming factor. 
Golden notes how Jacob Birnbaum intended to 
present the repression of the Soviet Jewry as a human 
rights crisis, exposing the USSR’s “false pretensions 
as a model society” and galvanizing already anti-
communist Americans.17 Like Martin Luther King 
Jr.’s determination to display the violent abuse of 
nonviolent protestors as a means of changing the 
hearts and minds of white Americans, Birnbaum 
sought to reveal the ugliness of the U.S.S.R. and to 
motivate both Jewish and non-Jewish Americans to 
act. This strategy would create conflict with the larger 
organizations later on, when the latter wanted to 
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avoid pressuring or defaming the U.S.S.R.
 However, the Jewish students’ relationship 
with the civil rights movement was not permanent, 
and eventually, many were isolated from its more 
progressive factions. A large turning point was 
the radicalization of the Students’ Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), which had Jewish 
leaders, including future Members of Congress 
Allard K. Lowenstein and Barney Frank, during the 
1964 Freedom Summer.18 However, the frustration 
with the lack of success and the rise of Black Power 
in the middle of the decade resulted in whites being 
“drummed out” from SNCC in 1965. The 1968 
New York teacher’s strike worsened the situation by 
degenerating the already tense relations between 
Blacks and Jews in New York City.19 As Peter 
Golden notes in O Powerful Western Star!, a vacuum 
eventually emerged for Jewish student activists that 
enabled them to “seek social justice on their own… 
turning them towards the U.S.S.R..”20 Effectively, with 
the ideological changes in the civil rights movement 
closing the doors for activism opportunities, many 
young Jews found a place with the Soviet Jewry 
movement.
The other major faction of the movement was 
the Jewish establishment, which financed efforts 
to raise awareness of the plight of Soviet Jews and 
inspire change. The most prominent group in this 
faction was the American Jewish Conference for 
Soviet Jewry (AJCSJ), which would later become the 
National Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ). As its 
name changed frequently, I will hereafter refer to the 
group as the Conference on Soviet Jewry, or simply as 
“the CSJ.” Founded in 1963, the CSJ was very much a 
top-down advocacy group with strong ties to major 
U.S. Jewish organizations. In fact, on nearly every 
piece of stationery it produced, it mentioned their 
support from “the Zionist Organization of America, 
Hadassah, B’nai Brith, the United Synagogue of 
America, the American Jewish Conference” and 
a host of other big names.21 The leader of the 
organization, Albert Chernin, was an older veteran of 
the umbrella group, the National Jewish Community 
Relations Advisory Council (NJCRAC), whose 
support included many organizations mentioned on 
the CSJ stationery.22
The CSJ, as well as its sister organization, the 
American Jewish Committee, did not always support 
demonstrations pioneered by the SSSJ. Instead, 
they preferred quiet diplomacy and the fostering 
of political relations to ensure the release of Soviet 
Jews. If one studies the civil rights movement and its 
influence on the Soviet Jewry movement to the fullest 
extent, it becomes evident that this cautiousness was 
also deeply rooted in its respective relationship with 
the civil rights movement. The AJC was generally 
against segregation and the Jim Crow laws, but was 
reluctant to support radical efforts. Through its 
official magazine, Commentary, the AJC expressed 
skepticism over the “fashion” of Jewish students 
partaking in civil rights protests in the early 1960s 
and published articles stating that former Jewish 
desegregationist activists had only achieved “very 
little.”23 
The AJC’s reluctance to embrace the radical 
activism espoused by the SNCC and SSSJ was not 
unique, but rather part of a longstanding skepticism 
towards mass movements. In his book Torn at 
the Roots, Michael Staub concedes that the AJC 
was active in helping both Jews and the NAACP 
with discrimination matters, but notes that it was 
unwilling to aid Popular Front causes sponsored by 
more radical activists like Paul Robeson, for fear of 
red-baiting.24 This lack of aid resulted in the AJC 
being labeled “the agency of the big bourgeoisie,” 
a Marxian reference to staidness and aversion to 
anything radical.25 In her book Troubling the Waters, 
Cheryl Lynn Greenberg describes the organization 
as being vocal about “racist incidents” or maladies 
affecting the Jewish community.26  Nevertheless, 
they tried “to cloak” their Jewishness, to avoid 
additional anti-Semitism, by having non-Jewish 
speakers address such causes.27 Ultimately, they 
were not driven to act as brashly as the SSSJ was by 
their ideology-driven politics inspired by the civil 
rights movement. Rather, they were an advocacy 
group primarily focused on results that could only be 
achieved through careful planning. The reluctance 
of the AJC and the CSJ to act impulsively would 
underlie much of the tension between them and the 
grassroots activists. 
In spite of this attitude, the CSJ actually had 
an important role to play in bringing mainstream 
American Jews to the side of Soviet Jewry. One 
example of their endeavors was their Matzoh of 
Hope project, in which the CSJ reached out to local 
synagogues during Passover to proliferate pamphlets 
about the plight of Jews in the U.S.S.R.28 The project 
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displays the cautious but clever activism of the CSJ, 
as it was able to show to American Jews the difficulty 
that the Soviet Jews had in celebrating the holiday. 
This enabled the CSJ to play at the heartstrings of 
American Jews while not stoking the fires of Soviet 
anger.
The CSJ was also extremely important in raising 
political support for the movement, going beyond 
the usual stream of Jewish New York politicians. 
In Frederick A. Lazin’s book, The Struggle for 
Soviet Jewry in American Politics, he makes note 
of how the organization had “full-time lobbyists,” 
who easily solicited members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives and Senate to support their cause 
by playing at the anti-communist rhetoric of the 
time.29 The CSJ also enabled politicians to get more 
intimately involved by having congressmen “adopt” 
a Jewish activist in the U.S.S.R., and even got the 
politicians’ spouses to fundraise for them through 
the establishment of the Congressional Wives for 
Soviet Jewry campaign.30 Their endeavors were so 
successful that by the 1968 Presidential Election, 
the matter of Soviet Jewry had become an issue on 
the platforms of both parties.31 The establishment 
had a place in trying to make a difference on behalf 
of Soviet Jews, but one that was achieved from the 
top down and by more traditional means of political 
organizing than marching in the street.
In this period of the 1960s and early 1970s, 
there did not seem to be a great distance between 
the two groups. However, the ideological and 
strategic fissures were unmistakably present in the 
correspondence between the SSSJ and the CSJ. The 
SSSJ Archives at Yeshiva University reveal several 
early conflicts between the two factions, including 
conflicts over credit sharing for campaigns. While 
the SSSJ would arrange for activists and organizers 
to protest, the more prominent organizations would 
make these events public to the national Jewish 
community in their newsletters. A CSJ Passover 
Report newsletter recovered from May 9, 1969 
mentions the SSSJ only once throughout the entire 
article. This brief reference occurs on the second 
page, where it is described as having taken part in a 
major protest, whereas the SSSJ had in fact organized 
it.32 The SSSJ appears to have been outraged, as 
reflected by a pen-written notation of a certain 
SSSJ member frustrated that the organization only 
received “a mention in the dispatches.”33 Tremendous 
anger, betrayal, and jealousy are evident in these 
sentiments, as well as a desire from the CSJ to 
disassociate from a faction that played a major role 
in shaping the protests. The patterns of disagreement 
between the two groups demonstrated by these 
documents show that their relationship was deeply 
troubled from within. 
On June 15, 1970, a catastrophe heightened 
the fundamental differences between the two 
factions. Out of desperation to emigrate, sixteen 
Soviet refuseniks bought tickets for all the seats on 
a small domestic flight. Under the auspices of being 
a wedding party, they intended to expel the pilots 
at a refueling stop and have a former military pilot 
amongst them, Mark Dymshitz, fly the plane to 
asylum in Israel by way of Scandinavia. The Soviet 
authorities at the Leningrad Airport stopped them, 
and all of the passengers were arrested. Dymshitz and 
the coordinator, Edward Kuznetsov, were sentenced 
to death for high treason. Beckerman writes about 
the outrage and protests this incited across the 
world, from striking “longshoreman in Genoa” to 
“schoolchildren in Stockholm” and all the way to 
New York City, where the SSSJ led a major march 
opposite the United Nations.34 
The Soviet treatment of its Jewish community, 
as made evident by the events surrounding the 
Leningrad hijacking, had finally become an 
international human rights issue. Although this 
incident cannot be cited as the single turning point, 
it certainly gave the SSSJ enhanced support for its 
activities. At the same time, the threat toward Soviet 
Jews had never seemed more palpable. Realizing the 
danger, the CSJ wanted to do everything it could 
to advocate for the release of these men while not 
inciting the anger of the Soviets. Their endeavors 
around this time were extremely tame in comparison 
to the mass marches desired by their grassroots 
counterparts. In one memo, they asked that the 
letters be “personal… non-political” and avoid 
“attacks on the Soviet system.”35 It appears they 
wanted to use a great deal of caution in handling this 
matter, and avoid causing problems for the hijacking 
pilots, Dymshitz, Kuznetsov and other Jews in the 
U.S.S.R.
Beckerman presents little evidence of a genuine 
split between the two groups. Rather, the image in his 
book of the movement is one of cautious solidarity 
in a time of crisis. He notes that the supporting 
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organizations of the CSJ, through a body called the 
Union of Councils, convened a meeting in 1971 
calling for “quiet diplomacy” and “inoffensive forms 
of action” for fear of endangering Soviet Jews. The 
grassroots activists did not support this method.36 
However, Beckerman does not focus on the SSSJ, 
but claims that the Jewish Defense League (JDL) 
and its leader, Rabbi Meir Kahane, manifested most 
of the dissent.37 This infamous demagogue not only 
condemned the mainstream Jewish groups, but 
also wanted violent retribution against the Soviets 
through bombing and attacking Soviet institutions. 
Beckerman’s focus on Kahane is very 
problematic and somewhat reductive. Kahane’s 
activity in this period—in which he made a series 
of terrorist threats against the Soviets, instigated 
violence, and allegedly bombed Soviet buildings—
was short-lived. Beckerman spends a chapter talking 
about his prominence after the Leningrad affair, but 
he says that Kahane’s organization soon fell out of 
favor among American Jews around 1971, leading 
Kahane himself to move to Israel. The focus on this 
individual detracts from issues that the SSSJ and 
similar, longer lasting groups had with the Jewish 
establishment that would eventually solidify their 
schism during the debate over Jackson-Vanik. 
Peter Golden, on the other hand, more 
successfully reveals the split between the two 
groups. Instead of focusing exclusively on Kahane 
as Beckerman does, he shows the JDL’s effect on the 
grassroots Soviet Jewry activists. In fact, he notes 
how “grassroots activists…agreed with Kahane” 
and shows the student disappointment with the 
establishment-heavy Union of Councils’ decision 
not to act more aggressively towards the Soviets.38 
This lack of aggression was against the goals of 
the SSSJ, who made it their mission to humiliate 
the Soviets. Golden makes note of one particular 
incident involving SSSJ ally Hillel Levine, who was 
so disgusted with the refusal to support significant 
action against the U.S.S.R. that he formed a sit-in 
of over one hundred Jewish students at a Boston 
meeting of the Council of Jewish Federations 
(CJF).39 His justification for going after this group 
was that the members were not allocating enough 
resources to activities related to Soviet Jewry. Here, 
the comparison with the civil rights movement 
becomes pertinent once again, in terms of tactics 
and motivation. The sit-in, the classic nonviolent 
demonstration favored by opponents of segregation, 
was being utilized in maintaining the shame factor 
against the Soviets. This episode once again shows 
the linkage between the grassroots activists and the 
civil rights movement, where it is drawn to such an 
extent that the Jewish establishment has taken the 
place of a segregated lunch counter or business.
From this, one can see that the dichotomy 
of strategy that emerged between the two groups 
during this period was instigated by the movement’s 
early struggles, and each faction’s reactions to the 
Leningrad Affair of 1970. There was clearly a strong 
desire from the part of the establishment to avoid 
endangering the Jewish population in the U.S.S.R. 
by any means necessary, as seen by their admonition 
of incendiary language. As a result, they did not 
want to allow the Leningrad Affair to balloon into 
a radicalizing incident among the activists and 
indirectly threaten the lives of Soviet Jews. While the 
grassroots activists did not necessarily support acts 
of terror, the allies of Richter, Birnbaum, and the SSSJ 
saw Leningrad as a wake-up call for greater action 
and pressure against the U.S.S.R. 
The two factions of the Soviet Jewry movement 
came of age in the 1960s, and although they had 
the same goals of emancipating the Soviet Jews, 
they had very different strategies. Although their 
respective orientations to activism may have been 
more ambiguous in the mid-sixties, by the end of 
the decade, they were better split into two strategic 
camps: one supporting strong actions against 
the U.S.S.R. and the other preferring backroom 
negotiations. The two factions would reach new 
chasms of separation in the 1970s, as the debate 
over the Jackson-Vanik Amendment hardened their 
ideological disparity. 
SECTION II: THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT
In the 1970s, a piece of legislation emerged 
that marked a turning point for the Soviet Jewry 
movement in the United States. This legislation was 
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Federal Trade 
Act of 1974, which drove the United States to be less 
conciliatory with the Soviets and placed the goals 
of the Soviet Jewry movement as more important 
factors in the shaping of U.S. foreign policy. In 
spite of what might seem like a great victory for the 
movement as a whole, the debate over the passage 
of the amendment produced controversy between 
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the grassroots and establishment factions. The 
grassroots activists heartily supported Jackson-Vanik 
from its inception in 1971 until the Gorbachev 
years and earned reciprocal support from Jackson, 
his allies, and the refuseniks. It is unclear how 
much the establishment backed the bill while it was 
being debated in Congress, but it is certain that 
they opposed it in the years immediately following 
its passage. In many cases, they even attempted 
to alter the legislation and as documents from the 
Conference on Soviet Jewry Archives show, were 
willing to negotiate directly with Soviet leaders to 
amend quotas for Jewish emigration.
While the Leningrad Affair may have 
heightened the strategic divide between the two 
factions, the passage of this amendment solidified it 
on a geopolitical scale. By supporting the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment, the grassroots activists now 
began to fall in line with American politicians who 
wanted to confront the USSR. In contrast, the Jewish 
establishment was more lukewarm about the bill, 
both during and after its passage, and preferred 
engaging the Soviets in a manner similar to détente. 
By the late 1970s, both groups were properly defined 
in terms of their own courses of action, and would 
remain that way until the Jews were allowed to leave 
the U.S.S.R. at the end of the following decade.
Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington 
introduced the bill alongside Congressman Charles 
Vanik of Ohio in 1972. It proposed an amendment 
to the Federal Trade Act that intended to help Soviet 
Jewry and to challenge the recent trend of working 
with the Soviets toward creating a thaw in the Cold 
War. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment sought to 
punish the “actions of nonmarket economy countries 
making them ineligible for normal trade relations, 
programs of credits, credit guarantees, or investment 
guarantees, or commercial agreements.”40  The 
first qualification for these non-market economy 
(communist) countries to be eligible for punishment 
was if the state “denie[d] its citizens the right or 
opportunity to emigrate.”41 Without looking at any 
other subtext, it appears that Jackson was referring 
primarily to the Iron Curtain.
When one considers Jackson’s political history 
and the events surrounding the passage of the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment, it is evident that the 
actions of the bill were not purely coincidental to 
the goals of the Soviet Jewry movement. Jackson 
enjoyed good relations with the American Jewish 
community due to this amendment as well as his 
previous support for Israel. According to SSSJ leader 
Glenn Richter, Jackson was very much in good stead 
with the grassroots activists.42 Richter also claims 
that Jackson’s senior aide at the time, Richard Perle, 
was frequently in contact with the SSSJ and held a 
number of strong, similar convictions of his own on 
the matter.43 Unlike Jackson, Perle was Jewish, and 
according to Richter, had a great deal of sympathy for 
Soviet Jews. SSSJ founder Jacob Birnbaum also had 
warm relations with both men and was reportedly 
in “close contact” with Jackson and Perle as early 
as 1965, seven years before the amendment was 
proposed.44 The SSSJ strongly advocated for “the 
utilization of economic pressures on the Kremlin” 
and as such saw the Jackson-Vanik Amendment as 
very favorable.45 It is not entirely clear whether the 
SSSJ had any direct influence on the crafting of this 
bill, but, given this relationship, SSSJ involvement is 
not unlikely. 
Before the passage of the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment in 1974, the United States was engaged 
in a process of détente with the U.S.S.R., during 
which increased trade, open communication, and 
military restrictions were observed. Détente was the 
brainchild of Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon’s 
National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State 
from 1973-1977. Before his career in Washington, 
Kissinger was a professor of international relations 
at Harvard, where he strongly defended realpolitik, 
a system that was decidedly “anti-ideological.”46 His 
primary foreign policy goal was to establish a state 
of order and balance in the world that would most 
benefit the United States. 
Kissinger’s accommodationist directive, along 
with the Ostpolitik thawing of relations between East 
and West Germany, became popular at this time 
when the threat of nuclear war was very real. To 
establish this order, Kissinger sought more peaceful 
relations with the People’s Republic of China and 
the U.S.S.R. Steps toward improved relations include 
Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, as well as the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviets. 
Kissinger also sought to normalize relations with 
the Soviets by being in constant contact with Soviet 
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and improving trade 
relations with the U.S.S.R., especially in the form of 
grain exports and the shared benefits of “scientific 
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exchanges.”47 In spite of these changes, the Nixon 
administration escalated the war in Vietnam by 
overseeing the 1970 bombing of Cambodia and 
supported various anti-communist coups in South 
America, including the 1973 junta that overthrew 
Chilean President Salvador Allende.iv,48 There 
seemed to be no coherence of human rights or even 
anti-communism in Kissinger’s work, but rather a 
balance of power that he sought to maintain between 
the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the Third World. 
If anything, Kissinger’s policies represent the furthest 
deviation from any of the previously mentioned 
ideology-driven politics.
The historiography confirms that Jackson’s 
primary motivation for drafting the amendment 
was aiding Soviet Jewry. In his biography of Henry 
Kissinger, Walter Isaacson describes Jackson as 
being motivated to write the bill in 1972 after the 
Soviets passed a “prohibitively high ‘education tax” 
on people emigrating, which he describes as “an 
exit tax primarily aimed at Jews.”49  Isaacson also 
wrote that prior to the bill, Jackson opposed granting 
the U.S.S.R. “Most Favored Nation” status in trade 
unless “restrictions on Jewish emigration were 
lifted.”50 Similarly, Jussi Hanhimaki claims in The 
Rise and Fall of Détente that the bill was primarily 
in protest to this veiled “exit tax” targeted toward 
Jews. Beckerman supports this view by highlighting 
Jackson’s close relationship and empathy with the 
Jewish people.51 He notes that Jackson’s desire to 
stand up for Jewish causes came from his role in 
the liberation of Buchenwald concentration camp 
in 1945, after which he became a “strong defender 
of Israel and the Jews.”52 In fact, Beckerman notes 
that Jackson responded so personally and viscerally 
to this particular affront on Jewish welfare that he 
began working on the amendment immediately after 
learning about the exit tax. 53
Unlike his nemesis, Henry Kissinger, Jackson 
also fit in well with the overarching trend of political 
action based on ideology, linking him philosophically 
to grassroots activists more closely. His biographer, 
Robert G. Kaufman, describes Jackson as being an 
ardent supporter of “a strong civil rights bill, national 
health insurance,” and labor unions from his early 
days in Congress in the 1940s through his support 
iv  The U.S. involvement in Allende’s ouster is a controversial subject. While 
the extent of the CIA or the State Department’s engagement with the junta 
led by Augusto Pinochet has been debated, I accept Jussi Hanhimaki’s view 
that it was “if not supported, at least condoned by the Nixon and Ford 
Administrations.”
for the Civil Rights Act of 1964.54 At the same 
time, Jackson was a hardcore anti-Communist who 
defended the Vietnam War and the development 
of new nuclear weapons to counter the Soviets. 
He firmly opposed SALT and any other weapon 
reduction plans.55 This delicate balance between 
progressive domestic policy and hawkish foreign 
policy may seem idiosyncratic to some; however, 
Jackson’s views can be interpreted as fulfilling a 
higher purpose for a better, more equitable life for 
all. The supposedly immoral forces of unrestrained 
capitalism and institutional racism as well as 
Soviet-style communism served as obstacles to this 
perceived moral aim, and he sought to undermine 
them. The oppression of Jews in the U.S.S.R. was 
one case of moral injustice that had to be countered 
by aggressive action, a sentiment quite similar to 
the ones mentioned in Jacob Birnbaum’s first SSSJ 
newsletter.
In theory, it makes sense for all the Jewish 
groups to get behind Jackson and that unanimity 
over Soviet Jewry prevailed to change the course 
of American foreign policy. This is the view 
upheld by Gal Beckerman, who points to the 
collaboration between Jewish groups at this 
time as evidence of unanimous support for 
Jackson-Vanik. He talks little of opposition in 
the community to the bill and notes that Jackson 
was able to seduce even the Conference on Soviet 
Jewry and “the Jewish Establishment” to support 
the amendment. 56 Beckerman notes that Jackson 
was able to do so not only by the appealing 
substance of the bill, but also by referencing the 
threat of a second Holocaust in Russia to large 
Jewish audiences, a tactic frequently used by 
Meir Kahane.v57 The only major threat to the 
amendment from within the Jewish community 
that Beckerman mentions is that of Max Fisher, a 
wealthy Republican philanthropist from Detroit, 
who opposed the bill as part of his dedication 
to Nixon. Beckerman makes Fisher look like an 
outsider whose views were never taken seriously 
by other community leaders.vi
However, in spite of this view, concern over 
the passage of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment 
v  The fear of a second Holocaust was a major rhetorical tool for mobilizing 
the Jewish community at this time, especially since the actual Holocaust was 
still fresh in many people’s memories.
vi  Beckerman is quite dismissive of Max Fisher throughout the eighth chapter 
of his book. Essentially, he makes him out to be like a Sheldon Adelson-type 
reactionary without the same kind of influence.
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at this time was quite palpable, and the 
community was once again more split than 
Beckerman assumes. Max Fisher was not the 
outsider Beckerman claims; he was, in fact, quite 
influential in the Jewish community. Fisher 
was head of the United Jewish Appeal (UJA) 
from 1965-1967, one of the most important 
Jewish organizations in America, as well as the 
American Jewish Congress and the Council on 
Jewish Federations.58 He was also responsible 
for major fundraising campaigns for Israel in 
the United States during the Six Day War and 
was the leading benefactor for the very large 
Jewish community of Metro Detroit.59 All of this 
suggests that he would have been taken seriously 
and likely had a certain amount of power over 
major Jewish organizations.
Fisher’s largest ally at the time was Jacob Stein, 
another man whose great importance Beckerman 
overlooks. Stein served as Chairman of the Council 
of Presidents, an umbrella group of all the major 
Jewish American charities. These two men arranged 
a special meeting with Nixon in 1973, bringing 
fifteen Jewish leaders with them including the CSJ 
officer Charlotte Jacobson. The President demanded 
that they abandon their support for Jackson-Vanik 
in order to better broker a deal with the Soviets on 
emigration. Nixon, the ever-brilliant manipulator, 
noted that the community leaders could “protest 
all [they] want” but that the Kremlin would not 
listen.60 The close connection between Fisher and 
Nixon further illuminates the Jewish establishment’s 
concern of not wanting to incite Soviet Jews. 
Isaacson’s book reveals that Kissinger actually worked 
behind the scenes to increase the number of visas 
given to Soviet Jews to 42,000 per year.61 Given 
Kissinger’s past statements, it would be difficult to 
believe he did this for humanitarian reasons, but 
rather aimed to show the Jewish establishment that 
he could be more useful to them if they opposed the 
amendment.  
The opposition to Jackson-Vanik from the 
Jewish establishment became more unified after 
President Ford signed it into law in 1974. In 
many circles, the newly codified amendment was 
popular and marked a major shift in U.S. foreign 
policy from accepting warmer relations with the 
U.S.S.R. to being more aggressive. However, as the 
establishment correctly predicted, Jackson-Vanik 
created a backlash in the U.S.S.R. that hurt the 
people it was trying to protect. The number of Jews 
permitted to leave annually decreased from nearly 
50,000 to less than 10,000 by the early 1980s, and the 
crackdown on refuseniks and their allies in the Soviet 
human rights movement only increased, with major 
players jailed.vii,62 This was evident in the arrest and 
imprisonment of famous refusenik Natan Sharansky, 
as well as the internal exile of noted scientist and 
reform activist Andrei Sakharov. 
The grassroots activists continued supporting 
the efforts of Jackson-Vanik, drawing recently 
liberated refuseniks into their coterie. One notable 
figure in this camp was Avital Sharansky, the wife of 
Natan Sharansky, who led a series of protests in the 
U.S. and elsewhere on her husband’s behalf during 
the nine years of his incarceration.63 Rabbi Avi 
Weiss, an SSSJ ally and civil disobedience advocate, 
and a multitude of grassroots supporters with 
whom Sharansky staged rallies and hunger strikes, 
accompanied her.viii, 64 Incidentally, Avital did not 
receive as much support from the establishment as 
she did from Rabbi Weiss and his followers. The CSJ 
initially refused to work for her husband’s release 
due to his dissident nature, and the CSJ’s fear of 
pressuring the Soviets.65 Henry L. Feingold notes that 
they even tried to dissuade Alan Dershowitz from 
running a full-page plea for Sharansky’s release in the 
New York Times.66 Even though, they later launched 
a series of vigils in solidarity with Sharansky, the 
CSJ’s relationship with his wife would never be as 
intimate as its relationship with Rabbi Weiss and the 
grassroots organizers.
Another example of this connection between 
dissidents and activists is the 1979 Solidarity Day 
rally in New York City (NYC), which was organized 
by SSSJ, under the CSJ umbrella. The long march 
down Fifth Avenue featured the Leningrad pilots 
Kuznetzov and Dymshitz. They had both been 
freed from Soviet custody after their respective 
death sentences were commuted, and had come to 
New York to advocate for other dissidents such as 
Sharansky, Ida Nudel, and Iosip Brugen.67 In front of 
several thousand people, they spoke alongside NYC 
Mayor Ed Koch and Senators Jackson, Jacob Javits, 
vii  Golden is of the opinion that it is not easy to say whether or not the 
amendment was a success.
viii  This story gives some idea as to the closeness in relations that Weiss and 
Sharansky had, especially when she came to the United States. To this day, 
Rabbi Weiss remains very close to the Sharanskys and has written at length 
about his activism for Natan.
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and Pat Moynihan, all of whom strongly advocated in 
favor of the establishment of the right to emigration 
and the maintenance of the amendment. This 
Solidarity Day shows that the refuseniks were not 
only intimately tied with the grassroots movement, 
but also had strong continual support from members 
of the American government.
In contrast to the support of further pressure 
against the U.S.S.R., the Jewish establishment was 
growing increasingly nervous about its unintended 
consequences, and became more solidified in its 
support of more détente-like negotiations, which is, 
in turn, reflected in documents from the American 
Jewish Committee. These newsletters, taken from 
the AJC’s archive at the American Jewish Historical 
Society reveal a conscious effort to pursue a policy 
of supporting waivers from Jackson-Vanik for 
increased emigration quotas. One newsletter from 
1980, written by AJC leader Richard Maass, reveals a 
strong discomfort with earlier support for Jackson-
Vanik. Maass noted that the overall breakdown of 
“détente, trade and cooperation” allowed for “little 
that the U.S. could apply to Russians to get them 
to allow greater numbers of Jews to leave.”68 This 
breakdown was clearly enabled by the passage of the 
amendment, as Maass seemed to be suggesting that 
its very forceful approach obstructed the possibility 
for future negotiations. Another memorandum from 
AJC leader David Geller said that the “restraint of 
trade,” a reference to Jackson-Vanik, was causing 
the breakdown in negotiations.69 Both documents 
displayed a type of thinking that differed from 
Jackson’s ideology-driven politics. Instead, they 
seemed similar to Kissinger’s approach, couched in 
political realism as opposed to the activist language 
of passionate ‘solidarity’ and ‘struggle.’ 
The AJC even went as far as meeting with 
the respected Soviet scientist Dr. Sergey Rogov 
to gain some leverage in backroom negotiations. 
One memorandum suggested that getting close to 
Rogov could enable the Soviets to “release [their] 
Jewish prisoners of conscience, allow the refuseniks 
to emigrate, and increase the general level of 
emigration of Jews.”70 Rogov, who invited AJC agent 
Neil Sandberg to come to Moscow to begin talks, 
warned that the only way to increase any progress 
with the negotiations would be for the Americans 
to show “friendship initiatives” so as to suggest 
the Soviets were not being pressured. Dr. Rogov’s 
demand substantiated some of the concerns that 
the American Jewish establishment had regarding 
demonstrations and pressure tactics under Jackson-
Vanik. Moreover, in the wake of the Soviet response 
to the amendment, they were desperate enough to 
make a deal with a figure that was not as prestigious 
as Brezhnev or Dobrynin.
 This decade was, overall, highly 
transformative for both American foreign policy and 
the Soviet Jewish movement. As the U.S. government 
changed the way it interacted with the Soviets, 
partly due to the actions of its Jewish community, it 
presented a point of no return for the activists. The 
ideological separation between the grassroots and 
establishment activists that grew throughout the 
late 1960s and early 1970s was solidified due to the 
consequences of this bill. Following Jackson-Vanik, 
the grassroots activists and their refusenik allies were 
more committed to putting political pressure on the 
U.S.S.R. than ever before. 
With the end of détente and negotiations, the 
establishment faction would continue to negotiate to 
release small numbers of Soviet Jews to no avail. It 
would take an even greater change in government to 
enable them to change their strategy, a change that 
would finally achieve visible progress in helping the 
Soviet Jews. This progress would ultimately derive 
from the multi-faceted dynamism in American 
policymaking that combined attributes of both 
factions. The Reagan Administration, which could 
balance an extreme ideological anti-communism 
with the pragmatism of effective diplomacy, could 
effect such a change.
SECTION III: REAGAN, SHULTZ, AND THE RE-
ALIGNMENT
In the 1980s, there was a major U.S. foreign 
policy shift as the Reagan administration came to 
power. Unlike previous presidents, President Ronald 
Reagan supported the goals of the Soviet Jewry 
movement, primarily as part of a larger strategy to 
confront the U.S.S.R. and end communism. Both of 
these were part of an ideological approach to politics 
that differed from President Nixon’s foreign policy 
pragmatism and President Carter’s more universal 
morality-driven politics, where Reagan held the 
eradication of international communism above all 
else. He and George Shultz, Reagan’s second and 
longer-serving Secretary of State, continuously put 
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a great deal of pressure on the U.S.S.R. to release 
refuseniks and eliminate immigration quotas. 
The functionality of the relationship between the 
President and the movement was evident in the close 
connections Reagan made with certain activists and 
the Jewish community’s praise for Secretary Shultz’s 
work. 
Reagan’s ideological approach to eliminating 
communism and its largest standard-bearer fit in 
with the trend of political action that the SSSJ had 
been following since its inception, which led to the 
ideological understanding and connection between 
them. He also felt a personal affinity to its activists 
and the refusenik victims of Soviet oppression, 
as seen by his relations with individuals such as 
Avital Sharansky, which will be discussed in greater 
depth in this section. Similarly, President Reagan 
and Secretary Shultz’s later focus on negotiations 
as a means of achieving their ends also satisfied 
the previously cautious Jewish establishment. The 
establishment, in turn, became comfortable enough 
to demand more pressure to release Soviet Jews. This 
change, made possible in part by an administration 
sympathetic to the cause, resulted in an increase in 
activity for the Jewish establishment, and a decline of 
divisions between the two factions of the Soviet Jewry 
movement. 
  President Reagan’s foreign policy was 
radically different from that of his predecessors; his 
immediate predecessor, President Carter, based his 
foreign policy primarily on universal human rights. 
He claimed to be guided by “morals and principles,” 
as he willingly increased pressure on both the 
U.S.S.R. after their 1980 invasion of Afghanistan, 
and authoritarian right-wing governments in Latin 
America and elsewhere.71 At first glance, President 
Carter may seem like the poster child for ideology-
driven politics, similar to those of President Reagan. 
However, President Carter was more focused on 
achieving ends in foreign policy to support universal 
human rights, while President Reagan, Senator 
Jackson, and the civil rights movement’s visions were 
more focused on achieving specific political ends. 
For example, Carter was not as radical as 
Senator Jackson in opposing the U.S.S.R. and was 
willing to negotiate with them through a second 
round of SALT agreements, which he claimed was 
“in the interest of American security and world 
peace.”72 According to these words, President Carter 
was an individual much more focused on general, 
loftier goals, not necessarily trying to achieve direct 
ends like defeating Jim Crow laws or weakening 
the U.S.S.R. By contrast, President Reagan used 
his ideology-driven politics as justifications for his 
actions, which in terms of foreign policy were almost 
exclusively focused on defeating communism. In 
this sense, President Reagan’s goals and intentions 
were more directly in the service of an extreme anti-
communist ideology, despite having an inspiration 
beyond pure pragmatism. While continuing to 
oppose communist regimes, President Reagan 
reversed the Carter administration’s positions on 
certain foreign actors that he believed could have 
been potential allies against the U.S.S.R. In doing 
so, he opposed sanctions on the apartheid-era 
government in South Africa, supported Augusto 
Pinochet of Chile, and aided the Contras in 
Nicaragua.7374 Such things would have been against 
President Carter’s principles, which unlike President 
Reagan’s, were not wholly dedicated to the service of 
a specific ideology.
The justification for this split from previous 
U.S. policy is exhibited in a 1979 essay written 
by President Reagan’s future U.S. Ambassador to 
the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, in which 
she claimed that autocratic regimes were not as 
damaging as revolutionary communist regimes. She 
argued that the former would simply result in power 
changes, while the latter would “violate internal 
habits and values” of the countries they dominate 
and have caused “tens of thousands to flee.”75 This 
“Kirkpatrick Doctrine” differed from Kissinger’s 
détente, in the sense that it was ostensibly a foreign 
policy based on human rights. However, unlike 
Carter whose definition of human rights appeared to 
be more all-encompassing, President Reagan and his 
cabinet would ultimately determine what this meant. 
Hence, they supported certain political bodies that 
committed vicious human rights abuses.
 Fortunately for the Soviet Jewry movement, 
their cause fit perfectly into the vision of President 
Reagan and his cabinet. The matter of Soviet Jews was 
one of protecting the religious and cultural freedom 
of an oppressed minority against what President 
Reagan saw as a hegemonic communist power. 
Fittingly, President Reagan appointed people, who 
were great admirers and associates of Senator Jackson 
to his staff, whose staunch anti-communism meshed 
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well with his. Among these individuals were Paul 
Wolfowitz and Elliott Abrams, both of whom would 
go on to serve a series of senior positions in the State 
Department, in addition to Jackson’s aide, Richard 
Perle. President Reagan greatly appreciated these 
individuals, and after Senator Jackson died suddenly 
of an aneurysm in 1983 at the age of 71, President 
Reagan honored him with a posthumous Medal of 
Freedom and said that he was “proud to have Jackson 
Democrats serve in [his] administration.”76 The 
Soviet Jewry movement was in a unique place, given 
that its allies now occupying important places in the 
executive branch when, less than a decade ago, it had 
been in opposition to the President. 
The change of Senator Jackson’s allies to the 
executive branch represented a fusion in the morally 
driven political work that marked the grassroots 
faction of the Soviet Jewry movement. As mentioned 
in the previous section, Senator Jackson, with 
his fusion of liberal domestic policy and hawkish 
foreign policy, was a notable exemplar of ideology-
driven politics in the transition period between the 
movement’s birth and the 1980s. The appointment 
of his aides to the State Department not only put 
supporters of the Soviet Jewry movement in powerful 
positions, but also enlisted people with a perspective 
similar to that of the grassroots activists as architects 
of President Reagan’s foreign policy. While Reagan 
was much more politically conservative than activists 
in civil rights movement, he shared with them, 
Senator Jackson, and the grassroots activists of the 
Soviet Jewry movement, a political perspective based 
on working to achieve a larger ideological goal. He 
was focused on defeating communism above all 
else, just as the SNCC members were focused on 
defeating Jim Crow, and just as the SSSJ members 
were committed to extending emigration rights to 
Soviet Jews. 
President Reagan’s steadfast opposition to 
communism and the U.S.S.R. is evident in many 
aspects of his behavior, including his introduction 
of the ambitious and highly controversial Strategic 
Defense Initiative, colloquially known as “Star Wars.” 
This program intended to stop potential Soviet 
missiles by using a satellite system to destroy them 
from space, were they to be launched. Ostensibly, 
it was a defensive measure, but many liberal critics, 
such as Senator Edward M. “Ted” Kennedy (D-
MA), derided Star Wars as too costly and nuclear 
warmongering.77 However, Reagan’s willingness 
to spend the money and risk nuclear provocation 
to oppose the Soviets demonstrates a dedication 
to his ideology above mere pragmatism. Whereas 
a pragmatist may have preferred a less costly or 
imaginative program for defense, the ever-dedicated 
Reagan would have been willing to risk the financial 
and potentially human cost in the creation of this 
system.
Additionally, President Reagan showed a 
willingness to get close to certain activists tied to the 
grassroots movement and act on their behalf. One 
example was President Reagan’s relationship with 
Avital Sharansky, whom he first met in 1981. She had 
come to the White House to talk to the President 
about her husband Natan, who had been “in the 
gulag” and whose weight, due to a combination of 
hunger strikes and forced starvation, was “down 
to 100 lbs.”78 President Reagan, by meeting with 
this woman, granted her access, in contrast to that 
in past administrations, such as President Nixon’s, 
which would only be limited to powerful fundraisers 
like Max Fisher as mentioned earlier in the paper. 
However, President Reagan’s empathy towards 
Sharansky’s incarceration appeared to border on 
righteous, visceral anger. He wrote in the diary entry 
for that day, “Damn those inhuman monsters... I 
promised I’d do everything to obtain his release and I 
will.”79 This highly emotional and dedicated behavior 
shows how President Reagan’s ideology dominated 
his political decisions. Looking to this diary entry, it 
demonstrates that Reagan indeed felt for Sharansky, 
but the President’s writing was also in accordance 
with his own vision of an evil U.S.S.R. persecuting 
innocent minorities, which may not have been 
Reagan’s view in the case of similar human rights 
abuses committed by the apartheid-era government 
in South Africa. 
Reagan did, in fact, act on this promise to 
himself and Avital Sharansky by continuously asking 
the Soviet leadership to release Natan. Immediately 
after his 1981 meeting with Avital, Reagan asked 
Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev to grant Avital’s 
husband an amnesty, in what seemed to be an 
ostensibly humble, private letter. 80 However, he 
unmistakably threatened Brezhnev in the last 
line where he wrote, “I’m sure however that you 
understand that such actions on your part would 
lessen problems in future negotiations between our 
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two countries.”81 
It should be noted that this letter was penned 
during major grain negotiations between the U.S. and 
the U.S.S.R., where Reagan had his first opportunity 
to move toward economic reconciliation. The 
U.S.S.R., which was enduring shortages due to its war 
in Afghanistan, could have used the U.S. demand 
to gain wheat exports and an easing of trade.82 
However, President Reagan threatened to hurt the 
U.S.S.R. with faltering negotiations, if they did not 
deal with Sharansky’s persecution. He, like Senator 
Jackson, was willing to inflict continued and serious 
economic damage on the U.S.S.R., if they did not 
agree to his request. President Reagan’s dedication 
in this episode shows how far the presidency 
had come from the days of Secretary Kissinger. 
Reagan’s administration partook in the politics of 
action, as espoused by the grassroots activists, not 
just that of mediation. President Reagan’s rhetoric 
reflects a genuine dedication to the service of his 
ideology, where he was willing to upset the course 
of international stability for the protection of an 
individual and the belittling of the U.S.S.R. It seems 
very unwise to some, but as was the case with Star 
Wars, the subordination of pragmatism to ideology 
was a natural decision for him. In the ultimate 
service of destroying communism and the U.S.S.R., 
coexistence was of secondary priority to Reagan. 
Threatening the U.S.S.R. was a much more natural 
option for Reagan, as it enhanced the possibility of 
engaging the communist superstate as opposed to 
letting it live.
Despite this pressure, Reagan’s presidency 
nevertheless saw peaceful negotiations and 
conversation with the Soviet leaders, both about 
Soviet Jewry and larger matters, which greatly 
pleased the Jewish establishment. Such a pattern 
of behavior became more prevalent in his second 
term, when Mikhail Gorbachev became the Soviet 
premier. Gorbachev was more committed to reform 
in both domestic and foreign policy than his 
predecessors had been. The foreign policy reform 
was best seen in the period of negotiations starting 
with the Geneva Summit of 1985, which marked 
President Reagan’s first meeting with Gorbachev. 
During these talks, the two leaders were focused on 
matters, such as arms reduction and increased trade. 
It was very productive, and from 1985 onwards, 
relations between the two nations began to thaw. In 
addition to easing business relations between the 
two superpowers, President Reagan and Gorbachev 
signed the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
Treaty, a major ban on intercontinental ballistic 
missiles that partially assuaged fears of nuclear war.83 
President Reagan, assisted by his Secretary of State 
George Shultz, appeared to be moving back in the 
direction of Secretary Kissinger and détente. 
In spite of these changes, however, Secretary 
Shultz pressured the Soviets to act in the interests 
of their Jewish citizens. He notes in Turmoil and 
Triumph, his memoir of his State Department 
service that the repeatedly stated U.S. concern for 
Soviet Jewish emigration rights would be brought 
up in negotiations, whether things were “going 
well or poorly on other issues of concern.”84 Shultz 
recognized that the Soviets were using Soviet Jews as 
“pawns” for future negotiations as they had done in 
Secretary Kissinger’s time, and he pushed the Soviets 
on the matter in almost every meeting from 1982 to 
1989.85 
Throughout this period, Shultz frequently 
earned the warm support of the Soviet Jewry 
movement. He had stellar relations with the CSJ who 
honored him in 1984 for his efforts and was again 
honored in 1988 by the Hebrew Immigrant Aid 
Society, after the majority of his successes had come 
to pass. At this second dinner, he referred to Morris 
Abram, the head of the CSJ, as his “rabbi.”86 Secretary 
Shultz also performed acts of calculated solidarity 
with the other faction, such as a 1987 Passover 
Seder he led in Moscow for refusenik leaders like 
Ida Nudel and Iosip Brugen, who had recently been 
released after incarceration in the gulag throughout 
the previous decade.87 Like Reagan’s relations with 
Wiesel and Avital Sharansky, this was his entrée into 
the grassroots movement. 
The praise from the Soviet Jewry movement was 
not without substance, as Secretary Shultz proved to 
be relentless in his demands to the Kremlin. When he 
began as Secretary of State, he first pushed to release 
the refuseniks, a group he saw as emblematic of the 
larger Soviet Jewry struggle. Eventually, the Soviets 
released Natan Sharansky in 1986, who after nine 
years of being the poster child of Jewish persecution 
in the U.S.S.R. was escorted to West Berlin under the 
auspices of a “spy-swap.”88 This decision came after 
Secretary Shultz had been working for four years 
for his release. The U.S.S.R. saved face by making it 
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seem like a prisoner trade. In Sharansky’s place, the 
United States handed over several Chilean scientists 
accused of espionage.89 The following year, refuseniks 
Iosif Begun and Ida Nudel were also released due 
to U.S. pressure. Even after all these emancipations, 
Shultz pushed Gorbachev to allow the emigration of 
“the millions of other Soviet Jews,” during the tense 
Reykjavik Summit of 1987.ix,90 
Nevertheless, whenever President Reagan 
and Secretary Shultz appeared to be making less 
progress than hoped for and the status of Jews 
within the U.S.S.R. seemed to worsen, the Soviet 
Jewry movement did not cease in their demands of 
the administration. This time, however, it was the 
establishment that applied most of the pressure. In 
1984, the year before Gorbachev was made premier, 
only 1,000 Jews were allowed to leave the U.S.S.R. 
per year, down from the already low quota of 10,000 
that existed five years prior and deemed a “profound 
crisis” by the Conference on Soviet Jewry.91 Before 
the Geneva conference, there was a major protest 
of 250,000 people in NYC, organized by the SSSJ 
but sponsored by the Conference on Soviet Jewry. 
It is notable that even though the administration 
was on their side, a more mainstream group like the 
CSJ was willing to sponsor a mass demonstration 
demanding even more action. Moreover, CSJ leaders, 
including Morris Abram and Herbert Kronish, spoke 
to Secretary Shultz before the Geneva conference, 
calling on him to pressure his Soviet counterpart, 
Andrei Gromyko, for the release of “all Soviet 
prisoners of conscience” and “exit visas” to anyone 
wishing to emigrate.92 This was a much bigger step 
than previous bargains, and the CSJ seemed to be 
adopting a more radical approach in this demand, in 
spite of the ongoing desperate situation.
Clearly, a transformation had taken place in the 
movement. The establishment was no longer content 
to be cautious and negotiate over the lives of a select 
number of Soviet Jews, but was willing to demand of 
Secretary Shultz emigration rights for all Soviet Jews. 
The CSJ’s willingness at such a dire time to organize 
protests and pressure the government show a shift of 
the establishment in regard to the role the grassroots 
organizers had previously played. This shift was 
indicative of a change in the place of Jewish groups in 
U.S. politics. In the past, the establishment was more 
ix  By 1987, Gorbachev was making significant steps in his steps toward 
liberalization, yet it was still very difficult for many people in the U.S.S.R. to 
emigrate or obtain an exit visa.
moderate in its tactics as its goal was not in tandem 
with the White House, and Jackson-Vanik had 
not yet been passed. Though matters of infighting 
would persist, it seemed as if the major disparity of 
strategy between the two factions was diminishing 
as the Reagan era progressed, and the Soviet Jewry 
movement achieved a new foothold in foreign policy. 
As seen beforehand, this was partly due to their own 
activities, which laid the groundwork for a President 
to come in with ideas and an ideology in step with 
theirs.
The release of the refuseniks and other major 
progress made for Soviet Jews throughout the 
1980s led to a legendary final major rally. This was 
the Freedom Sunday for Soviet Jews held at the 
National Mall on December 6, 1987, on the eve of 
a major meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan. 
Although the grassroots groups worked to mobilize 
hundreds and thousands of marchers, and the 
mainstream organizations put up the money and 
speakers, the separation between the two groups was 
still present. While many refuseniks and leaders of 
Jewish organizations spoke, no member of the SSSJ 
did, nor was any member invited to be on the dais. 
Not even SSSJ founder Jacob Birnbaum or ally Avi 
Weiss, who had both engaged in hunger strikes and 
civil disobedience for years, were given air time at 
this climactic rally.93 The grassroots activists and the 
Jewish establishment may have both been winning 
the fight, but at the end of it all, they were still fairly 
divided.
In 1989, Gorbachev lifted the emigration 
restrictions. The Jews of the U.S.S.R. were finally 
allowed to leave, and over the next ten years, 
almost two million of its two-and-a-half-million 
strong community settled in other countries where 
they could freely practice their religion without 
government prohibitions and express support for 
their homeland. The Soviet Jewry movement in the 
United States was not able to entirely to overcome 
its internal divisions. However, it undoubtedly 
made tremendous progress due to shared goals, and 
both factions working with the cooperative Reagan 
administration, which consequently enabled them to 
develop a stronger voice in addressing these policy 
matters.
CONCLUSION
The transformation of the Soviet Jewry 
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movement in the United States between the 1960s 
and 1980s not only represented a great victory for 
the two factions of the movement, but also helped 
bring about a major change in U.S. foreign policy. 
When the movement started in the early 1960s, only 
a select number of prominent activists and politicians 
came to its aid, but, as time progressed, the matter 
became a focal point of late-Cold War diplomacy. 
My thesis displays this transition, especially in 
sections one and two of the paper. Jackson-Vanik 
and the repercussions associated with its passage 
made the cause of Soviet Jewry a focal point of U.S. 
foreign policy by driving policy makers out of the 
stagnancy of détente and into a more interventionist 
approach. Such a change allowed the ideas of the 
grassroots activists to become more accepted by 
the executive branch, as they fit in greatly with the 
new aggression taken towards the Soviets. Yet the 
Reagan Administration’s commitment to peaceful 
negotiations with the U.S.S.R. regarding Soviet Jewry 
reflects a certain degree of calm similar to the Jewish 
establishment, who as mentioned earlier, remained 
close with the President and the Secretary of State. 
Essentially, the success of this movement was based 
on a multi-faceted dynamism that combined the best 
of both Soviet Jewry movement factions. 
The transformation from realpolitik pragmatism 
in the Kissinger years to a palpable show of executive 
strength against the U.S.S.R. came during the Reagan 
administration, as demonstrated in the third section 
of this paper. President Reagan maintained an 
ideology-driven foreign policy primarily dedicated 
to vanquishing communism and all of its negative 
consequences, including the persecution of Jews 
within the largest Marxist-Leninist state. It was the 
combination of having a common enemy and having 
a shared goal, which enabled genuine action to be 
taken on behalf of their brethren in the U.S.S.R. 
While President Reagan was more ideologically 
compatible with the ideas of the grassroots activists 
than the previous Cold War presidents like Nixon 
and Ford, under whom Kissinger served, as well 
as Jimmy Carter, he certainly had not abandoned 
mainstream Jewish organizations, who still 
maintained their old ties to the executive branch. It 
was during Reagan’s presidency that the ideas of both 
groups had relative parity in terms of acceptance 
and influence on the President and his advisors, 
and where the disparate strengths of both factions 
came together for a foreign policy victory for the 
emigration rights of Soviet Jews.
It can be determined that both groups had 
something unique to contribute to the success 
of their movement and to elevate the state of 
Jews in both the U.S.S.R. and the United States. 
Through their constant campaigning and their 
civil rights movement-influenced activism, the 
grassroots activists stirred in hundreds of thousands 
of American Jews to demand a change in U.S. 
engagement with the Soviets. While their numbers 
were comparatively small, they were able to maintain 
a constant indefatigable energy throughout the 
three decades of the movement’s existence, and to 
concentrate their energies on achieving tangible 
solutions. Supporting Jackson-Vanik before and 
after its passage enabled the movement to daringly 
challenge the mainstream of American foreign policy, 
in spite of the potentially damaging consequences in 
the U.S.S.R. President Reagan and Secretary Shultz’s 
gumption in pressuring Gorbachev to remove the 
emigration quotas in the 1980s would not have been 
possible without the fundamental policy change 
secured in the preceding decade. By going against the 
more powerful forces of the Jewish community who 
were afraid to challenge the status quo, advocates like 
Jacob Birnbaum, Glenn Richter and the refuseniks 
were able to help create the healthy transition from 
détente to engagement.
Nevertheless, the Jewish establishment’s role 
in the movement should not be discounted. Their 
financial support and ability to spread information 
about the movement’s activities across the country 
was necessary for Jewish Americans outside the 
New York nexus of SSSJ activism to become more 
aware of the injustices committed in the U.S.S.R. 
The establishment’s constant lobbying and network 
of political supporters enabled the cause of Soviet 
Jewry to get the attention it would not have otherwise 
received. Its willingness to negotiate with the Soviets 
in the 1970s may seem to have been the lost plan in 
achieving release for Soviet Jews. However, alongside 
political pressure, it was this strategy that Reagan and 
Shultz chose to help realize the movement’s goals. 
Likewise, the same flexibility and practicality that 
marked this wing of the movement, as opposed to 
the justice-seeking rigidity of the grassroots activists, 
enabled them to change their strategy in the 1980s 
to pressure the President and the Secretary of the 
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State to push for all Jews to be released. From behind 
the scenes, it is undeniable that the establishment 
remained vigilant and effective in securing the release 
of Jews behind the Iron Curtain.
It was in fact the fusion of their efforts that 
made this transformation of an ethnic cause 
into a Cold War foreign policy position possible. 
The Reagan administration’s policy of aggressive 
negotiation in a way marks this fusion, as it combines 
the dedication of the activists with the flexibility 
of the establishment leaders. It is not clear what 
would have happened if there had been no factions. 
It is possible that the movement would have been 
disregarded as another Jewish bloc without the mix 
of strategies and alliances necessary to achieve its 
ends. Like so many other successful causes, the Soviet 
Jewry movement would not have succeeded as a 
monolith. What may have seemed like problematic 
relations at the time produced a sort of crucial 
synthesis of ideas needed to bring the shared goals of 
the campaign to fruition.
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